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Until recently the difference between Aristotelian, or traditional, logic and
Aristotle’s own Introduction ancient logic had been blurred.  Perhaps this is
attributable to scholars not having seen a special need to compare the two. 
However, it was really not possible meaningfully to distinguish the two until
modern logicians examined Aristotle’s syllogistic through the lens of
mathematical logic.  As a result, studies of Aristotle’s logic since the 1920s
have established his genius as a logician of considerable originality and
insight.  Indeed, we can now recognize many aspects of his logical
investigations that are themselves modern, in the sense that modern logicians
are making discoveries that Aristotle had already made or anticipated.  Not
the least of his accomplishments is having treated the process of deduction
itself, a fact long overlooked by students of logic.  Here we gather five
mathematical features of Aristotle’s logical investigations in Prior Analytics:
(1) logic is taken as part of epistemology; (2) syllogistic deduction is treated
metalogically; (3) rules of natural deduction are explicitly formulated; (4) the
syllogistic system is modeled to demonstrate logical relationships among its
rules; and (5) logical syntax is distinguished from semantics.  While each of
these features is perhaps remarkable in itself, when they are viewed together
they reveal the striking philosophical modernity of an ancient logician.
 
Features of Aristotle’s modernity.  Aristotle would agree with Alonzo Church
and other modern logicians that “(formal) logic is concerned with the analysis
of sentences or of propositions and of proof with attention to the form in
abstraction from the matter” (1956: 1).  This notion takes the discipline of
logic to be a metalogical investigation of underlying logics (1956: 57-58). 
Part of Aristotle’s philosophical genius is having established a formal logic
while at the same time making the study of logic a science.  He recognized
that deductions about a given subject matter are topic specific and pertain to
a given universe of discourse,1say to geometry or arithmetic or biology, but
that such deductions employ a topic neutral deduction system to establish
knowledge of logical consequence.  In Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics
and in Topics and Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle distinguished using a
logic to process information on a given subject matter from studying the
deduction system of an underlying logic.2Prior Analytics successfully
established a formal deduction system that could serve as an instrument for
demonstrative science, or apodeiktikê epistêmê, as this is outlined in
Posterior Analytics.  We are assured of Aristotle’s concern with the formal
matters of deduction when, at the outset of his treatment of the three figures in
Prior Analytics, he wrote that “sullogismos should be discussed before
apodeixis (demonstration) because sullogismos is more universal: an
apodeixis is a kind of sullogismos, but not every sullogismos is an
apodeixis” (25b28-31). Prior Analytics is a study of a system of formal
conditions for cogent argumentation.
 
Thus, when we read in De Anima that “the soul ... is like the hand; for the hand
is an instrument of instruments, and in the same way the mind is the form of
forms” (De Anima 3.8, 432a1-2), we can appreciate that Aristotle treated
logic as a part of epistemology.  In particular, he considered it to be that part
used to establish knowledge that a given categorical sentence follows
logically or necessarily from other given categorical sentences.  Aristotle
seconded this notion when in Posterior Analytics A10 he remarked that
“demonstration is not addressed to external argument but to argument in the
mind” (76b24-27).  A deduction system for Aristotle, then, is an epistemic
instrument of the mind by means of which someone is able logically to derive
theorems from the first principles of a demonstrative science.  The study of
such an instrument is focused precisely on the formal conditions of logical
consequence.  Aristotle and modern logicians share the same notion that
establishing knowledge of logical consequence is central to the study of logic.
 
We might underscore this aspect of Aristotle’s investigations by noting that at
Metaphysics 4.3-8 (cf. 11.5) he treated the most certain principle of all, to wit,
the law of non-contradiction, as well as the law of excluded middle.  He
expressed these laws both as ontological principles and as logical principles. 
Consequently, given that logic is a part of epistemology concerned with
establishing knowledge of logical consequence and, moreover, that a logic
has an ontological underpinning that makes it impossible for true sentences to
imply a false sentence, we understand that Prior Analytics is a metalogical
treatise on the syllogistic deduction system and, indeed, on the formal
process of deduction itself.
 
In Prior Analytics Aristotle turned his attention away from object language
discourses and toward objectifying the formal deduction apparatus used to
establish scientific theorems.  Aristotle was especially concerned to
determine “how every sullogismos is generated” (25b26-31).  He
accomplished this by exhaustively treating every possible categorical
argument pattern3 having a premise-set of two categorical sentence patterns
with places for three different terms.  Aristotle studied only these patterns
because two categorical sentences have the ‘the fewest number of terms and
premises through which something different than what was initially taken
results necessarily'.4 Accordingly, he demonstrated which of these patterns
have only valid argument instances and which patterns have only invalid
argument instances.  The results of his study, particularly in Prior Analytics
A4-7, serve as elements in his deduction system.
 
Now, to separate the patterns with only valid instances, that is, the
sullogismoi, from the patterns with only invalid instances, Aristotle used two
metalogical processes: (1) the method of completion and (2) the method of
contrasted instances.5 The method of completion (teleiousthai or teleiôsis) is
a deduction process carried out in the metalanguage of Prior Analytics.6 This
process explicitly employs, as Aristotle’s choice of verb suggests, the four
teleioi sullogismoi, or perfect sullogismoi, of the first figure as rules of
deduction to establish which second and third figure argument patterns are
sullogismoi.  Aristotle’s interest here is to establish which argument patterns
have only valid argument instances.  Every argument with semantically precise
terms fitting one of these patterns is valid.  In this way he identified fourteen
sullogismoi in three figures.7 It is important to recognize that Aristotle treated
the sullogismoi individually and not axiomatically; his metasystematic
treatment of the sullogismoi is inductive and not deductive.8 Aristotle
identified every argument pattern with only invalid argument instances by the
method of contrasted instances.9 His metasystematic treatment of the non-
syllogistic argument patterns is likewise inductive and not axiomatic.  The
method of contrasted instances is interestingly different from either the
modern method of counterargument or the method of counterinterpretation
precisely because it invalidates argument patterns and not argument
instances.  It is noteworthy that Aristotle does not provide even one instance of
the method of counterargument in Prior Analytics A4-7.10 We attribute this to
his concern with argument patterns and not arguments per se.
 
A sullogismos, then, as specifically treated in Prior Analytics A4-7, is a
relatively uninterpreted object.  In fact, it is an elemental argument pattern with
only valid argument instances.  In Prior Analytics Aristotle was principally
concerned to treat argument patterns and not arguments in much the same
way that a geometer treats triangles and parallelograms apart from a
carpenter’s concern, for example, with this or that triangle, etc.11
 
It is worth noting in this connection that Aristotle employed, at least implicitly,
the semantic principle of form, that two arguments having the same form, or, in
Aristotle’s case, fitting the same strict syllogistic pattern, are both valid or both
invalid.  He established a relationship between an argument’s pattern and its
validity or invalidity.  This is especially well stated a number of times in Prior
Analytics when Aristotle summarized the results of his studies in A4, A5, and
in A6.  He wrote, for example, of the second figure:
it is evident both that a sullogismos is generated
necessarily whenever the terms are related to one
another as was stated, and that if there is a
sullogismos, then it is necessary for the terms to
be so related.  (A5, 28a1-3; cf. A4, 26a13-16 &
26b26-28, A5, 27a23-25, and A6, 29a11-14)
 
For there to be a sullogismos it is necessary and sufficient that terms be
formally related as Aristotle stated in a number of rules.  Likewise, for there
not to be a sullogismos, it is necessary and sufficient that terms be formally
related in the other ways he systematically examined, likewise stated in
rules.12
 
We can now appreciate a third aspect of Aristotle’s logical sophistication. 
Aristotle recognized the epistemic efficacy of the sullogismoi – that is, the
elemental argument patterns having only valid instances – and he explicitly
formulated them as rules of deduction in corresponding sentences.  In Prior
Analytics A4-7 Aristotle established a set of deduction rules as part of his
natural deduction system.13 One process of deduction is accomplished by
taking pairs of given categorical sentences to generate immediate inferences
according to prescribed rules; these inferences are then added to the given
sentences and then again taken in pairs, to wit, syllogistically (sullogistikôs),
until a final conclusion is reached (see esp. Prior Analytics A25).14 Aristotle
treated this process in a fashion exactly analogous to chaining immediate
inferences by using rules of propositional logic.  In Prior Analytics A4-7
Aristotle treated a sullogismos exactly as a topic neutral rule of deduction. 
He used the expression ‘technê sullogistikê’, or the syllogistic art, in
Sophistical Refutations 11 (172a35) to capture his thinking.15
 
We can now appreciate a fourth mathematical feature of Aristotle’s study of
logic.  Prior Analytics (esp. at A1-2, 4-7, 23, 45) is a proof-theoretic treatise
in which Aristotle demonstrated certain of the logical relationships among
syllogistic deduction rules.  Aristotle even modeled his syllogistic logic, albeit
in a rudimentary way, to describe and to study the system in order to establish
theorems about the system’s properties.  Indeed, we see that Aristotle
developed an artificial language, although not strictly a formal language, to
help model his logic better to reveal its properties.  Although it is stretching the
point to say that Aristotle approximated inventing an uninterpreted language,
we might, nevertheless, recognize a move in this direction.16
      
Again, it is worth noting on a related matter that Aristotle expected scientists
to construct what amounts to a logically perfect language for each universe of
scientific discourse.  This requirement for demonstrative knowledge is
forcefully expressed at Metaphysics 11.5 (cf. Metaphysics 4.4 and Prior
Analytics B3) where he exhorted philosophers to eliminate equivocation and
ambiguity and to eschew the use of metaphor in scientific discourse.  He
wrote:
 
Those, therefore, who are to communicate with one
another by way of argument must have some
common understanding … Every word must
therefore be intelligible and indicate something
definite, not many things, but only one; and if it has
more than one signification, it must be made plain
in which of these the word is being used.  He,
therefore, who says that ‘this is and is not’ denies
what he affirms, with the consequence that he
declares the word to signify what it does not
signify; but this is impossible.  Consequently, if ‘this
is’ signifies something, it is impossible to assert
truly its contradictory.  (1062a11-19)
 
In Prior Analytics Aristotle’s interests were not immediately focused on the
practice of performing object language deductions but on questions that
compass the foundations of deductive sciences.  Aristotle treated syllogistic
entities and their relationships just as modern mathematical logicians have
treated the relationships among the operators and deduction rules of
propositional logic.  And he understood his logical investigations in just this
way.
 
We have already mentioned the metalogical process of completion, whose
epistemic import is to establish which argument patterns can serve as rules of
deduction.  Aristotle’s proof-theoretic theorem concerning completion is that
“all the ateleis sullogismoi are completed by means of the first figure
sullogismoi using probative and reductio proofs” (A7, 29a30-33).17 Aristotle
used metalogical deductions to establish the sullogismoi.  The complement
to completion, the method of contrasted instances, has as its epistemic
import to eliminate certain elemental argument patterns as possible rules of
deduction.
 
But one of Aristotle’s more remarkable proof-theoretic results is
accomplished at Prior Analytics A7 where he treated the reduction (anagein
or anagôgê) of sullogismoi.  This matter has caused considerable difficulty
for interpreters, a part of which consists in their having confused reduction with
analysis (analuein or analusis) in their zeal to axiomatize Aristotle’s
syllogistic.18 However, a careful reading shows that for Aristotle reduction is a
proof-theoretic process that establishes certain deduction rules to be
redundant or unnecessary in his deduction system: the same deductive results
can be obtained by using a select number of rules.  At A7 he treated the
logical relationships among all the sullogismoi taken as rules.  Thus, when
treating the reduction of the sullogismoi, Aristotle was not concerned to
demonstrate the validity or invalidity of a given argument or to show that a
given argument pattern is a sullogismos (as at A5-6).  Rather, he was
concerned to demonstrate that a conclusion is shown to follow for each of the
established sullogismoi by using only the two universal teleioi sullogismoi as
deduction rules.  While his process of reducing the sullogismoi is
metasystematic, it is nevertheless an inductive process that employs a
deductive step; Aristotle tests each possible result individually and not
axiomatically.19 Aristotle’s theorem concerning reduction is that “all the
sullogismoi can be reduced to the two universal sullogismoi in the first figure”
(A7, 29b1-2).  Expressing this in modern terms, we see that Aristotle
demonstrated the logical independence of the two universal sullogismoi of
the first figure.20
 
Our final observation about Aristotle’s logical acumen concerns his having
distinguished logical syntax from semantics in a way familiar to mathematical
logicians.  While it is doubtful that Aristotle had a modern theory of language,
and surely did not work with a string-theoretic formal language, it is
nevertheless true that he recognized different logical patterns to underlie
sentences involving, for example, ambiguity and equivocation.  This, of
course, applies a fortiori also to arguments.  One way sufficient for
determining whether a logician distinguishes logical syntax from semantics is
to ascertain whether a logician works with a notion of interpretation or re-
interpretation.  We believe that Aristotle worked with neither notion.  However,
another equally sufficient way is to determine whether a logician works with a
notion of substitution, a process by which one changes the language, or the
content words in a given argument, while leaving their meanings and the
logical form fixed.  Aristotle’s pervasive use of schematic letters – not
variables21 – to mark places for terms, his naming terms by their schematic
positions, and his practice of substitution indicate his having distinguished
semantics and syntax.  Moreover, throughout his discussion Aristotle
systematically treated patterns of sentences, patterns of two premises with
places for three different terms and their corresponding argument patterns
schematically.  And he did this according to a strict syllogistic syntax without
reference to particular arguments.22 He even explicitly named four logical
constants in just the same manner as modern logicians (A4, 26b30-33):
“belongs to every”, “belongs to none”, “belongs to some”, “does not belong to
some”.  We can turn to Sophistical Refutations to corroborate our point about
Aristotle distinguishing semantics and syntax.
 
In Sophistical Refutations Aristotle used the word ‘sullogismos’ to denote an
argument that fits an argument pattern having only valid instances, and he
used the expression ‘phainomenos sullogismos’, or apparent sullogismoi, to
denote an argument that appears to fit such a pattern but which really fits
another, non-syllogistic pattern, for example, one with four terms as in a case
of equivocation.  In such cases Aristotle recognized that a given word or
expression may have two different meanings and thus fall into two different
semantic domains or denote two different terms.  Thus, while a two-premise
categorical argument with an equivocal term has a given grammatical pattern
that makes it appear to be a sullogismos, it really has an underlying logical
pattern different from a sullogismos.  And these logical patterns were
precisely Aristotle’s concern in Prior Analytics, and they may even have been
presupposed for his study in Sophistical Refutations.  These patterns are
strictly formal and independent of a given object language.  Moreover, these
patterns are independent of the particular use to which a given object
language argument might be put, whether as a hypothetical argument, or as a
dialectical, a didactic, a demonstrative, or an eristic argument.23
 
Modern mathematical logicians, we know, make a clear distinction between
logical syntax and semantics, but they believe that Aristotle was not
sophisticated enough to make this distinction and that, as a result, he did not
define “logical consequence” or “following necessarily”.  However, if we turn to
Metaphysics 5.5 we recognize a sophistication precisely in his defining
“necessary” just as he used the concept in Prior Analytics: “that which is
necessary is that having no other relationship” (1015a34).  At Metaphysics
4.5 he wrote much the same: “for it is not possible for what is necessary to be
one way and another, and so if something is of necessity, it cannot be so and
not so” (1010b28-30).  Interestingly, he also made an explicit reference to
demonstration at Metaphysics 5.5 in connection with the passage cited
above:
 
demonstration is of necessary things, because, if
there is a demonstration proper, it is not possible
for there to be any other relations; the reason for
this is the premises, for if there is a sullogismos it
is [logically] impossible for there to be another
relationship among them.  (1015b7-9)
 
Thus, a sullogismos is such that no other result is logically possible.24 We
have seen above how Aristotle understood the relationship of terms in
premises fitting given argument patterns.
 
In this connection, we also recognize Aristotle to have very clearly
distinguished truth from validity.  This is especially evident at Prior Analytics
B2-4 where he systematically treated the various possibilities of valid
arguments with combinations of true and false sentences as premises and
conclusions in the three figures.  Aristotle was keenly aware of the difference
between (1) establishing knowledge of the truth or falsity of a given sentence
(whether by induction or by deduction) and (2) establishing knowledge of the
validity or invalidity of a given argument.  And, likewise he keenly grasped the
difference between the necessity in each case.  In addition, he also
distinguished validity from deducibility.  In this respect it is interesting to
consider his metasystematic claim at Prior Analytics A30:
 
For if nothing that truly belongs to the subjects has
been left out of our collection of facts, then
concerning every fact, if a demonstration for it
exists, we will be able to find that demonstration
and demonstrate it, while if it does not naturally
have a demonstration, we will be able to make that
evident.  (46a24-27)
 
This statement surely points to Aristotle’s concern with the practical power of
his syllogistic system as an epistemic instrument for obtaining scientific
knowledge.  Moreover, this passage suggests a modern concern with the
completeness of a deduction system, that is, with whether every logical
consequence of a set of sentences is deducible using a given set of
deduction rules (cf. A23).  As we know, making a distinction between syntax
and semantics is thought to be necessary for asking about the completeness
of a set of deduction rules.  The statement from A30 cited above surely makes
evident that Aristotle thought about the foundations of a system of logic,
although his completeness proof in this connection has features different from
that of a modern logician’s proof.25
 
Summary.  We have highlighted five aspects of the remarkable modernity of
Aristotle’s thinking about logic.  (1) Aristotle took logic to be a part of
epistemology.  A logic is used to establish knowledge of logical
consequence, and the science of logic takes this as its principal concern.  (2)
Prior Analytics is a metalogical treatise on the syllogistic deduction system. 
Aristotle exhaustively treated all possible combinations of ‘syllogistic’
argument patterns to determine which have only valid argument instances.  (3)
Aristotle recognized the epistemic efficacy of certain elemental argument
patterns having only valid instances, and he explicitly formulated them as rules
of natural deduction in corresponding sentences.  (4) Prior Analytics is a
proof-theoretic treatise in which Aristotle described a natural deduction
system and demonstrated certain of the logical relationships among
syllogistic rules.  In fact, Aristotle modeled his syllogistic in a rudimentary way
for this purpose.  One important metasystematic result is to have established
the independence of a set of deduction rules.  Finally, (5) Aristotle worked with
a notion of substitution sufficient for distinguishing logical syntax and
semantics.  In this connection he also distinguished validity from deducibility
sufficiently well to note the completeness of his logic.
 
Our reading of Prior Analytics takes Aristotle to have treated the process of
deduction much as modern mathematical logicians do and not to have been
confused about some fundamental matters of logic.  Least of all was he
confused, as commentators such as Günther Patzig (1968: 16-42) believe,
about a distinction between “following necessarily” and “being necessary”,
both in respect of the distinction between a sullogismos, or a deduction, and
a demonstration (apodeixis) and of the distinction between assertoric logic
and modal logic.  Aristotle clearly distinguished between (1) a given
sentence’s following necessarily from other sentences and (2) a given
sentence denoting a state of affairs to be necessary (or possible).  Grasping
him to be concerned with the deduction process helps us to avoid such an
error.  In any case, Aristotle recognized that, while the conclusion of a given
argument follows necessarily from its premises, this necessity may not be
evident to a participant.  He knew that the epistemic process of deduction
produces knowledge, or makes evident, that a given sentence follows
necessarily from other given sentences.  He considered the product of this
epistemic process to be an argumentation that includes a deductive chain of
reasoning in addition to the given premises and conclusion.  He recognized
using deduction rules in the epistemic process for establishing validity. 
Furthermore, Aristotle distinguished (1) the subject matter of a given argument
from (2) the use to which a given argument might be put from (3) the varying
expertise of a participant.  All these matters are distinct from (4) the formal
matters underlying any of them.  And precisely to examine these formal
matters was his project in Prior Analytics.  In this connection, then, we
understand Aristotle to have distinguished two kinds of knowledge that cannot
be otherwise: (1) knowledge of what is true or false, which pertains to
sentences, and (2) knowledge of what is valid or invalid, which pertains to
arguments.
 
Concluding remarks.  Only recently have we been able to recover something
of Aristotle’s promethean accomplishments relating to logic.  Indeed, we are
recognizing more and more that part of the history of modern logic is to have
re-invented the wheel that Aristotle turned many years ago.  It is astonishing
that for hundreds of years, perhaps dating to before the Port Royal Logic,
Aristotelian logic, or traditional logic, has been taught without a single
reference to the process of deduction.  It has been the practice of R. Whately,
W. S. Jevons, H. W. B. Joseph, J. N. Keynes, R. M. Eaton, and many others. 
It is still the practice in untold numbers of introductory textbooks on categorical
logic to test a syllogism according to rules of quality, quantity and distribution
and entirely to overlook the deduction process of chaining syllogisms, not to
mention the glaring traditionalist error to take a syllogism to be either a valid
or invalid argument.
 
Jan Lukasiewicz can be credited with shedding light on the syllogistic by
being the first to examine it with the theoretical apparatus of mathematical
logic.  But Lukasiewicz and his followers really only ‘improved’ the
traditionalist interpretation with a sophistication afforded by mathematical
logic.  Both lines of interpretation took Aristotle’s presentation in Prior
Analytics to be his own axiomatization of the syllogistic.  While traditionalists
awkwardly drew lines between sentences in different syllogisms to indicate
their logical relationships (their analyses or transformations), axiomaticists
such as Lukasiewicz cleverly turned a sullogismos into a logically true
conditional proposition that could be processed by a propositional logic.  In
this way the axiomaticists indicated the logical relationships among the
syllogisms.  Again, the epistemic process of deduction treated in Prior
Analytics was overlooked.  It was not until the early 1970s with the work of
John Corcoran and Timothy Smiley that the case for Aristotle’s reputation as a
logician of consummate intelligence and originality was well argued.  They
established Aristotle to be concerned with a deduction process just as many
modern logicians are.  Corcoran and Smiley also used mathematical logic to
model Aristotle’s logic.  However, instead of finding an axiomatization of a
logic, they discovered a natural deduction system.  But they remained puzzled
by reduction, in part, we believe, because they did not think that Aristotle
modeled his own system of deduction rules nor that he could envision
distinguishing syntax and semantics.  Our interpretation builds on the work of
Corcoran and Smiley, and now on that of Robin Smith whose recent
translation of Prior Analytics (1989) has incorporated their findings.  We
believe, however, that Aristotle did model his own system.  In particular, we
read him as treating a sullogismos as a rule of deduction at Prior Analytics
A4-7, and that he himself was able proof-theoretically to determine certain
properties of his deduction system.  He was able to refine the system by
eliminating redundant rules, and he affirmed his system’s completeness. 
These are Aristotle’s own accomplishments, not merely those of modern
logicians who, using mathematical logic, believe themselves to have
discovered features of the syllogistic unknown to Aristotle.  Indeed, modern
logicians might wonder at their ‘having spoken’ Aristotelian logic their whole
lives without any idea of it.
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(a) sentence as a conclusion and the other a universal privative (e) sentence
as a conclusion.  However, it is a simple matter to adapt his method to the
method of counterargument, and thus to produce two arguments each with
true premises and a false conclusion, by switching his substitution instances. 
Consider, in this respect, his invalidating any syllogistic argument having two
universal privative sentences in the first figure at A4, 26a11-13. 
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19Reduction here is not per se a deduction process, but a process that
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simplify his deduction system.  Aristotle demonstrated that each of the second
and third figure sullogismoi, as well as the two particular sullogismoi of the
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figure) among the sullogismoi and implicitly established that the ateleis
sullogismoi (second and third figures) are redundant rules in his deduction
system. 
21We believe that Aristotle took each letter to be a schematic letter, and not a
logical variable, in a way similar to W. O. Quine’s meaning of “a dummy to
mark a position” (1970: 12; cf. 1982: 33, 145-146, 160-162). 
22However, Aristotle did provide many instances of categorical arguments
with two premises, particularly in respect of his method of contrasted
instances for invalidating argument patterns. 
23This collection might perhaps be extended to include the modal syllogistic
treated at Prior Analytics A3, 8-22. 
24This holds notwithstanding that a weakened a or e sentence (i. e. an i or o
sentence) is a different sentence.  This is a trivial truth for Aristotle; see Prior
Analytics B1, 53a3-14, esp. 53a12.  “To be otherwise” refers to contrariety
and contradiction. 
25The intuitive aspect of Aristotle’s completeness proof at A23 (cf. A7 on
reduction) is roughly captured by the modern notion of mathematical
induction.  For Aristotle, the elemental syllogistic argument patterns capture
every possible valid argument having a premise-set of two sentences.  These
elemental argument patterns constitute (along with the conversion rules) the
elements of (syllogistic) deductive reasoning.  Every extended syllogistic
discourse (sic. a deduction) is reducible to a chain of sullogismoi, that is, to a
chain of immediate inferences generated syllogistically (sullogistikôs).  Every
valid categorical argument having more than two premises can be completed,
that is, its conclusion can be deduced syllogistically by generating a chain of
immediate inferences, to wit, a chain of sullogismoi.
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